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 Factualism, Normativism and the 
Bounds of Normativity 
 THOMAS M.  BESCH    sityUniver  fo  
 ABSTRACT: The paper argues that applications of the principle that “ought” implies 
“can” (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between “ought” and 
“can” is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, “factualist” conception 
of OIC and endorse weak “normativism.” Even if we use OIC as the rule cannot“‘ ’therefore
‘ought   
 
not’,” applying   OIC is not a mere   matter of facts and logic,    as factualists
 
 
claim, but often draws on “proto-ideals” of moral agency.  
 RESUME: Cet article défend que les applications du principe «“devoir” implique 
“pouvoir”» (OIC pour l’anglais ‘ought’ implies ‘can’) dépendent de considérations 
normatives quoique ce lien soit de nature logique. Nous devrions donc rejeter la 
conception «factuelle» de l’OIC et plutôt défendre un «normativisme» faible. Même en 
supposant que l’on utilise l’OIC comme étant la règle «“ne pas pouvoir” implique “ne 
pas devoir”», appliquer l’OIC n’est pas seulement une question de faits et de logique, 
comme le soutiennent les «factualistes», mais découle souvent de «proto-idéaux» de 
l’agentivité morale. 
 Introduction 
 The principle that “ought” implies “can” (or OIC) continues to play an important 
role in everyday normative debate. Where demands, principles, requirements, 
standards, or, more generally, normative views, prescribe what cannot be done 
or be brought about, there, it is often assumed, trumping objections are in 
place. Moreover, such objections are often taken to be drawing on a constraint 
that all reasonable normative debate must meet, rather than to be expressing, 
Sydney  
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say, a reasonably controversial normative demand. Despite the fundamental 
role that OIC is often awarded, though, OIC is the subject of disputes where it 
is made the focus of discussion in its own right. One dimension in which such 
disputes arise concerns the link between “ought” and “can.” Does “ought” 
entail or at least presuppose “can”? Or is the link, as some argue, extra-logical 
in nature? 1 A second dimension concerns the systematic status of OIC. Is OIC 
a meta-ethical principle that neutrally ranges over all ethical codes, or does it, 
as some insist, express a kind of ethical commitment in its own right? Two 
further dimensions are less prominent, but no less important. Third, then, what 
kind of “can” does OIC invoke? Even where we agree about the logic and 
status of OIC, we still can disagree about what sort and level of physical, psy-
chological, intellectual, or other limitations allow an inference from “cannot” 
to “not ought.” A closely related fourth dimension concerns the nature of the 
usage we make of OIC. OIC is often applied as a rule such as “ cannot therefore 
 not ought ,” or as a tool to comb out “oughts” that run up against (alleged) facts 
about human limitations—in a way, that is, that treats these (alleged) facts as 
given and fi xed, rather than vice versa, and that takes the application of OIC to 
be a matter of facts and logic. But should we think of OIC in such, say,  factu-
alist terms? People can reasonably disagree about what kind of “cannot” gives 
OIC suffi cient grip, and such disagreement often is not about facts or logic, but 
invokes genuine normative issues. But if that is so, it would seem, factualism, 
or at least pure forms of factualism, cannot fully capture the nature of the usage 
we make of OIC. 
 My discussion will in the fi rst instance focus on the second, third, and fourth 
dimensions. The main aim of my discussion is to suggest that non-trivial appli-
cations of OIC signifi cantly depend on normative, if not ethical, considerations 
 even if we plausibly assume that the link between “ought” and “can” is logical 
in nature. That is, even if OIC is a logical principle, non-trivial applications of 
OIC will tend to cut across the meta-ethical and the fi rst-order ethical. In fact, 
they often draw on what I shall call “proto-ideals.” This, we shall see, suggests 
that the factualist view of OIC is misguided in an important respect. It might 
be right to use OIC as the rule “ cannot therefore  not ought .” Even so, applying 
OIC is not simply a matter of facts and logic: there are normative, and some-
times ethical, considerations in play where we decide that a given “cannot” is 
of the appropriate kind to give OIC suffi cient grip. To make this case, I will 
assume that the link between (prescriptive, choice-guiding) “oughts” and 
“can” is logical, and, more precisely, presuppositional in nature (I will elabo-
rate on this later). My case does not depend on this reading of OIC, however, 
as its main focus is not on the link between “ought” and “can” but rather on the 
sort of considerations that come into play in determining what kind of “can” or 
“cannot” suits the purposes of OIC. 
 In section 2, I shall distinguish between a factualist conception of OIC and 
its polar opposite, namely, what I shall dub “normativism.” A rejection of pure 
normativism will then set the stage for the search for a more modest form of 
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normativism that escapes the problem of pure normativism but goes beyond 
factualism in elevating the role normative considerations play in the applica-
tion of OIC.  Section 3 elaborates on the presuppositional view of OIC, and 
asks what kind of “can” is presupposed by “ought.” While “ought” always 
presupposes the “can” of logical possibility, I shall argue, non-trivial applica-
tions of OIC can, and inevitably do, suppose richer and practically more rele-
vant forms of “can.” As sections 3 and 4 suggest, the question of what kind of 
“can” we should suppose in our usage of OIC often is an ethical question. In 
fact, I shall submit, this question is linked to the complex ethical theme of what 
proto-ideals we require agents to live up to in order to qualify as genuine par-
ticipants in the pursuit of doing right and being good. Against this background, 
fi nally, section 5 suggests a modest form of normativism—a view, that is, that 
does not reject the idea that we may employ OIC as the rule “ cannot therefore 
 not ought ,” but that takes it that the bounds of normativity must be determined 
at least partly on normative, and in many cases ethical, grounds. 2 
 Two Doxastic Policies 
 While OIC might play various roles in normative discourse and practice, at a 
more general level it seems to have a simple doxastic upshot. It requires our 
normative conceptions—that is, our views of what ought to be done or brought 
about, widely conceived—to cohere with our factual conceptions of what can 
or cannot happen, or be brought about, and in particular our views of human 
limitations. In meeting this requirement, however, different doxastic policies 
can be, and have been, applied. Consider the following exchange:
 Paul: For all the reasons that I can see, Peter really ought to do it! 
 Betty:  But Peter can’t do such a thing. So be reasonable: accept that your “ought” 
should give way. 
 Paul: I disagree. He really ought to do it. And since that is so, he is able to do it. 
 Betty rejects the purported “ought” in the light of the reasons she sees for the 
view that Peter cannot carry out the act in question. Paul reverses this order: he 
rejects the view that Peter cannot do the thing in question in the light of the 
reasons he sees for the view that Peter ought to do that thing. If we set ques-
tions of plausibility aside, both doxastic policies mark possible (though 
perhaps not equally reasonable or plausible) ways to apply OIC to confl icts 
between an “ought” and a “cannot.” OIC, like other conditionals, is doxasti-
cally bi-directional. If “X ought to  φ ” holds only if and when “X can  φ ” holds, 
then reasons to believe that X cannot  φ are indirect reasons to believe that it is 
not the case that X ought to  φ , while reasons to believe that X ought to  φ are 
indirect reasons to believe that X can  φ . At least in principle, then, we could 
implement OIC in two ways. On the one hand, we could implement the prin-
ciple (i) by way of assessing, or, if necessary, adjusting or revising, “oughts” in 
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the light of our reasons to endorse views of what cannot be done or be brought 
about. On the other hand, we could implement it (ii) by way of assessing, or, if 
necessary, adjusting, or revising, our factual views of what agents cannot do or 
bring about by the light of our reasons to endorse the relevant “oughts.” To use 
a term that surfaced above already, let us refer to (i) as a  factualist doxastic 
policy; as to (ii), we might call it a  normativist doxastic policy. 
 A note on these two policies is in order. Factualism in effect reads OIC from 
the perspective of the “can,” and so assesses and shapes “oughts” in the light 
of certain factual conceptions such as views of human nature or of human lim-
itations. Thus, the factualist policy in effect employs OIC as a maxim such as:
 FP:  As it is not the case that X ought to  φ if X cannot  φ , we should not assume that 
X ought to  φ if there is good reason to believe that X cannot  φ . (Thus, a pure form 
of factualism in effect employs OIC as the rule “ cannot therefore  not ought . ” ) 
 On this doxastic policy, reasons to assume that something cannot be brought 
about are treated as reasons to assume that it cannot be prescribed, demanded, 
required, and so forth. To put matters bluntly, factualism thus circumscribes 
the realm of intelligible “oughts”—and, as a subset of these, authoritative 
“oughts”—by factual conceptions, such as factual conceptions of the human 
condition or of human limitations. In a sense, then, factualism subjects norma-
tive conceptions to a test of compatibility with factual views, and so takes the 
bounds of normativity to be shaped by the factual. 
 Factualism looks like a fairly familiar stand. Most of us are factualists at 
least some of the time. Of course, ordinary normative disputes more often con-
cern the appropriateness, grounds, and consequences of normative views, 
rather than their intelligibility. And where people insist that something is 
demanded of them that they cannot do, this might not always tacitly or openly 
invoke OIC, but might instead express the view that the relevant demands have 
unacceptable implementation costs. Still, factualism appears to be a widely 
followed doxastic policy, both in practice and in theory. E.g., most of us grant 
that there are psychological and physical limits to our capabilities and powers 
that require us to waive or suspend otherwise authoritative demands—whatever 
moral outlook we might otherwise endorse. And where moral theories are 
rejected for placing demands on deliberation, motivation, or agency, that ordi-
nary people cannot live up to, there often is a commitment to some form of 
factualism in the background. 3 Note, though, that factualism as I understand it 
here is not simply the idea that human capacities and powers set limits to what 
can reasonably be demanded of human agents. Rather, it involves the idea that 
the setting of these limits is a factual matter and, accordingly, that we can iden-
tify those limits on non-moral grounds. 
 Turning now to the normativist stand, it in effect reverses the factualist order 
of priority. Rather than assessing normative conceptions in light of their com-
patibility with factual conceptions, normativism assesses, develops, adjusts, or 
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revises factual conceptions in light of their compatibility with normative con-
ceptions (or at least some, especially privileged normative, conceptions). On 
the normativist stand, then, we subject factual conceptions to a test of  norma-
tive acceptability . Normativism thus employs OIC as a maxim such as:
 NP:  As it is the case that if X ought to  φ , then X can  φ , we should not assume that X 
cannot  φ if there is good reason to believe that X ought to  φ . (Thus, pure norma-
tivism would in effect employ OIC along the lines of “ ought therefore  can . ” ) 
 Thus, it would express a normativist stand to argue that we should not accept 
views of human beings, or of the human condition, or of human limitations, 
that, given OIC, would render (allegedly) authoritative, fundamental “oughts” 
inapplicable to us. 4 For instance, normativists might reason from the view that 
we owe to others some degree of impartiality to a rejection of conceptions of 
human agency according to which people are incapable of showing even 
minimal forms of altruism. Normativism, then, treats (some) factual concep-
tions not as limiting, but as limited by, (some) normative conceptions. Thus, 
it takes it that the bounds of normativity are not, or not always, shaped by the 
factual. 
 Now, at fi rst sight, there is an aura of unreasonableness about normativism—or 
at least pure forms of normativism. True, if “ought” implies “can,” then there 
is a sense in which reasons to believe that X ought to  φ are indirect reasons to 
believe that X can  φ . But it does not follow that the presence of such reasons 
allows us to transit from “X ought to  φ ” to “X can  φ .” This is so because these 
reasons cannot simply be treated as trumping if and where there are other, 
standing reasons to believe that X cannot  φ . E.g., if Peter believes that Paul 
ought to save Jane from drowning, but there are reasons to believe that Paul is 
unable to do so—say, Paul is known to have a heart condition that will physi-
cally incapacitate him if he attempts to save her—then these reasons hold 
whether or not Peter also sees reasons for the “ought” in question. Prior to 
further argument, then, we may not transit from “Paul ought to save Jane” to 
“Paul can save Jane” (or “It is not the case that Paul cannot save Jane”) in this 
case. To generalize, even if we have good reasons to believe that X ought to  φ , 
we should, if and where there are standing reasons to believe that X cannot  φ , 
follow the factualist doxastic policy, if any. However, if that is right, then nor-
mativism seems to drop out of the picture entirely. After all, for there to be a 
meaningful opportunity to follow either factualism or normativism in the ap-
plication of OIC, there would need to be a meaningful, non-superfi cial confl ict 
between some views of what ought to be done and some views of what cannot 
be done. But in order to have that kind of confl ict, there would have to be rea-
sons of some relevant, at least initially credible sort in favour of  both kinds of 
views involved in the confl ict—including, as it were, the relevant factual 
views. And thus it seems that there would have to be standing reasons of the 
overall sort that block the transition from “Paul ought to save Jane” to “Paul 
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can save Jane” in our example. It hence seems that wherever normativism 
could meaningfully come into play, we should follow not the normativist 
doxastic policy, but the factualist policy. As it stands, therefore, normativism 
would seem to both be unreasonable and irrelevant. 
 “Ought” and “Can” 
 Even if a pure form of normativism of the sort expressed by NP is defective, 
there still might be plausible middle ground between normativism and fac-
tualism that signifi cantly elevates the role normative conceptions play in our 
application of OIC. To identify such middle ground, I shall suggest, we 
should focus on the vexing issue of “can”—rather than the “ought,” or the 
link between “ought” and “can.” Still, to fi x ideas, it is best to prefi x things 
with a brief statement of what, for my present purposes, I shall take to be the 
nature of OIC. Following Hare, I will (plausibly, I believe) assume that a 
presuppositional interpretation of OIC is accurate—at least for the case of 
prescriptive  ultima facie “oughts.” I hasten to add, though, that my case will 
be available even if we reject such an interpretation as long as we accept 
that OIC is true on some interpretation. Thus, I shall not defend a presuppo-
sitional view of OIC. Instead, I simply shall use it as a background for my 
case. 
 A presuppositional, Hare-type view of OIC comes down to this. 5 The rela-
tion between (prescriptively used) “oughts” and “can” is one not of conversa-
tional implicature or, more strongly, of entailment, but more like the relation 
between “The King of France is bald” and “There is a King of France.” The 
claim “The King of France is bald” can be true or false of the King of France 
only if there is a King of France. If there is no King of France, then one of the 
existential presuppositions of that claim is not fulfi lled: the claim is not just 
false, but unintelligible. Accordingly, we might (vaguely) say that “X can  φ ” 
expresses a presupposition of the intelligibility of “X ought to  φ .” If X cannot 
 φ , then “X ought to  φ ” is not false but unintelligible, and so must be denied 
externally: the “cannot” is a reason to believe not that X ought not to  φ , but that 
it is not the case that X ought to  φ —the negation involved here does not alter 
the content of the prescription but, rather, negates the prescribing. 6 Accord-
ingly, as much as a reasoner cannot reasonably ask whether the King of France 
is bald (or offer an answer to this question) unless she supposes that there is a 
King of France, she cannot, or not prior to further argument, reasonably raise 
the question of whether X ought to  φ (or offer an answer to this question) 
unless she supposes that X can  φ . 7 
 Now, this leaves out something that is crucial for our purposes. If “ought” 
presupposes “can,” then the way it does so is more complex than the way in 
which “The King of France is bald” presupposes “There is a King of France.” 
This complexity stems partly from the opacity of the verb “can.” Different in-
terpretations can be attached to this verb, each lending different modal strengths 
to claims of the form “X can  φ ,” thereby requiring different thresholds to be 
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met for “X can  φ ” to be true. On a suitable interpretation of “can,” for instance, 
“X can  φ ” would be true in any of the following scenarios: 
 (i)  X’s  φ ing is a logically possible event (or, say, X’s  φ ing is coherently 
conceivable); 
 (ii)  X’s  φ ing is an empirically possible event (i.e., it would not contradict 
the known regularities of nature); 
 (iii)  X is physically fi t to  φ ; 
 (iv)  X is psychologically (mentally, emotionally) capable of  φ ing; 
 (v)  X can become someone who would  φ if necessary; 
 (vi)  X will  φ if she sees a reason to; 
 (vii)  the costs of  φ ing for X are not unacceptably high. 
 Accordingly, both “X can  φ ” and “X cannot  φ ” can simultaneously be true of 
X— namely, on different interpretations of the verb “can.” Betty might physi-
cally be fi t to walk to the middle of the market square, and thus she  can do so 
in the senses of (i), (ii), (iii), and, let us assume, (vii), while her agoraphobia 
renders her unable to exercise that ability, and thus she  cannot do so in the 
senses of (iv) and (vi), even though (v) might be true of her. The above list of 
scenarios that can render claims like “X can  φ ” true of course is not exhaustive. 
At the bare minimum, for it to be true that X can  φ would seem to require that 
it is logically possible for X to  φ . Maximally, it might require something to the 
effect that X is prepared and ready to  φ . But there is much space between the 
extremes of logical possibility on one side, and utter readiness on the other. 
Correspondingly, there are many kinds and shades of impossibility, inability, 
limitation, or fi nitude that could reasonably be taken to render “X cannot  φ ” 
true of X. 
 These things are fairly platitudinous, and they have been observed before. 
That they nevertheless matter here is owed to the less obvious lesson that the 
entail. Kekes, for instance, writes:
 “Ought implies can” will here be . . . interpreted as follows: a person is morally 
obliged to do something only if it is in her power to do it or not do it. . . . What exactly 
is in one’s power to do is unclear. It is obvious that doing what is logically or physically 
impossible is not in one’s power. But there are other constraints as well. Physical and 
mental limitations peculiar to a person may also impose unavoidable limitations. 
Unobservant people cannot respond to subtle clues, dilettantes cannot have depth, 
and the lethargic cannot be quick on the uptake. What individual limitations are 
unavoidable is controversial. (459) 
 Kekes then goes on to tell us that he seeks to “sidestep this issue” in order to 
“simply say that, in addition to logical and physical impossibility, there are 
also unavoidable personal limitations on one’s power.” Kekes is certainly right 
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in his conclusion; yet, if we are interested to determine whether and how 
OIC can have ethical content, we should not sidestep this issue. 8 Instead, 
we should recognise that there are various interpretations that can be at-
tached to claims like “X can  φ ” and “X cannot  φ ”—or, as the above passage 
puts it, to “X has (does not have) the power to  φ ”—and, correspondingly, 
that it is possible for reasonable people to agree that X can (or cannot)  φ , 
but to  disagree as to whether “X ought to  φ ” is intelligible, if and where 
they disagree whether the sense in which X can (or cannot)  φ  is of the 
appropriate kind . 
 What kind of “can” (or “cannot”) would it be appropriate to suppose in a 
given context? For now, let us consider what kind of “can” (or “cannot”) it 
would be unreasonable  not to suppose in all normative contexts—that is, 
 whatever answer to the question just asked we would be inclined to give. 
Whatever our answer to that question, then, it would seem that we cannot 
reasonably reject the following view (we might dub it the “trivial conception,” 
or “TC”):
 TC: One cannot intelligibly claim that X ought to  φ unless it is, or at least one takes 
it to be, logically possible for X to  φ (in the sense that the claim “X can  φ ” is not 
semantically inconsistent). 
 It is at least in the sense of TC that the relation between “X can  φ ” and “X 
ought to  φ ” is as tightly knit as the relation between “There is a King of France” 
and “The King of France is wise.” As much as “The King of France is wise” 
could not possibly be true unless there is a King of France, it could not possibly 
be the case that X ought to  φ unless it is logically possible for X to  φ . To be 
intelligible, then, “X ought to  φ ” must at least prescribe the logically possible. 
 Of course, your claim that X ought to  φ (or should have acted accordingly, 
or is blameworthy for failing to  φ , and so on) will almost always give your 
hearers to understand that you believe that X’s  φ ing is possible not just in the 
thin sense of being a logically possible event, but in a richer, practically rele-
vant sense. And if what is prescribed can happen in the sense of being logically 
possible  only —as opposed to, e.g., being within what is, or at least should be, 
the agent’s reach—the reasonableness of the prescription will almost certainly 
be contested. This is so especially where others expect us to raise our norma-
tive claims in order to guide, inform, or infl uence the actual choices of real 
people. Nevertheless, while logical possibility puts the threshold for the appro-
priate kind of “can” not nearly high enough, at least not for the purposes of 
guiding choices, there can be, and is, reasonable disagreement over how high 
or low that threshold should be placed. Again, I might assume that “Paul ought 
to save Jane from drowning” requires merely that Paul’s saving of Jane would 
not defy the known regularities of nature—whether or not Paul is physically 
and psychologically fi t to save her. You might assume that this puts the thresh-
old too low, and that Paul “can” save Jane in the relevant sense only if he is 
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physically (or physically and psychologically) fi t to do so, and not otherwise 
forced not to do it. Even empirical possibility seems to be a threshold that 
could reasonably be seen as too high, and that hence is a possible subject of 
reasonable disagreement. Accidental confl icts between moral norms can make 
it empirically impossible for the agent to abide by all authoritative norms that 
apply in a given situation. And it is at least not obviously unintelligible to claim 
that one ought to act, or ought to have acted, on each of these confl icting norms. 
To say the least, as Montefi ore emphasizes, seeing oneself as blameworthy for 
failing to act on both of two confl icting norms is not unusual—and this seems 
to refl ect that “oughts” are not always taken to be unintelligible just because it 
is empirically impossible to act on them. 9 Moreover, there can be moral doc-
trines that advance  tragic norms—logically possible normative views, that is, 
that are taken to prescribe the impossible, but are nevertheless accorded au-
thority and treated as standards by which the moral qualities of agents are to be 
assessed (e.g., consider a maxim such as “We ought to be without sin” ad-
vanced by a doctrine that takes it that everyone is necessarily and inescapably 
tainted by sin). Perhaps such tragic norms might be defective in a range of 
ways, e.g., they might be ineffective, pointless, imprudent, redundant, oppres-
sive, or even cruel, but, again, it would seem that they are not, at least not ob-
viously, unintelligible. 10 
 The following might help to structure things. We can distinguish between 
(i) the “can” that “ought” presupposes as a matter of logic (at least given the 
hypothesis that there is such a matter of logic) and (ii) the “can” that “ought” 
presupposes from the point of view of potentially controversial, more sub-
stantive conceptions of the presuppositions of normative claims. Accord-
ingly, we can distinguish between (i*) a “cannot” that necessarily waives 
demands, i.e., the “cannot” of logical impossibility, and (ii*) richer, practi-
cally more relevant “cannots” that count as demand-waivers from the point 
of view of conceptions of the sort just referred to. Conceptually, or as a 
matter of logic, “ought” presupposes the “can” of logical possibility. This 
is the platitude that TC states. Yet in  conceptional respects—i.e., in the 
respect of competing conceptions of the sort of “can” that “ought” requires—
there can be different candidates for the role of the appropriate kind of “can.” 
By the light of such conceptions, normative claims might have to be waived 
if what they prescribe is logically possible but “cannot” be done in some 
richer, practically more relevant sense. For simplicity’s sake, let us also dis-
tinguish between  demand-enablers and  demand-waivers . Wherever we take 
“oughts” to require any particular kind of “can,” we imply conceptions of 
demand-enablers and demand-waivers. For instance, if we take it that “X 
ought to  φ ” requires that it is empirically possible for X to  φ , we treat empirical 
possibility as a demand-enabler and empirical impossibility as a demand-
waiver; similarly, where we take “oughts” to require physical or psycholog-
ical ability, we treat the presence of this ability as a demand-enabler and its 
absence as a demand-waiver. 
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 OIC and Proto-Ideals 
 To sum up, the above suggests an important limitation of factualism. We have 
in effect seen that inferences like 
 (1)  X cannot  φ . 
 (2)  Hence, it is not the case that X ought to  φ . 
 are problematic where the “cannot” in (1) is the “cannot” not of logical 
impossibility but rather of a richer, practically more relevant kind. In such 
cases, (2) does  not follow unless a suitable conception of demand-waivers is 
supplied, as in: 
 (1)   X cannot  φ ; 
 (1*)  X is unable to  φ in a way that is signifi cant (relevant, decisive, funda-
mental) enough to pass the threshold of a demand-waiver. 
 (2)   Hence, it is not the case that X ought to  φ . 
 Even if we accept (1), can we reject (2) if we dispute the appropriateness, 
relevance, or authority of (1*). Agreement about logic and the relevant facts, 
then, does not commit us to agreement about which “oughts” OIC combs out 
as unintelligible—that is, even if we apply OIC along factualist lines. Such 
agreement requires, as well,  that we share suitable conceptions of demand-
waivers . To suggest otherwise is a key shortcoming of factualism. 
 Now, what kinds of inabilities, limitations, or fi nitudes would be signifi cant 
enough to waive or suspend “oughts”? How high (or low) should we place the 
threshold of demand-waivers? What levels of human capacity, skill, or devel-
opment should we adopt as demand-enablers, thus taking them to mark prereq-
uisites for the application of “oughts”? And should we endorse the same set of 
demand-waivers and demand-enablers for all “oughts,” or different sets for 
different types of “oughts”—depending on, e.g., the contents of “oughts,” their 
moral importance, or the likely consequences of waiving them? What we have 
seen so far suggests that such questions cannot be answered merely on grounds 
of whatever factual reasons we have in the fi rst place to believe that X can or 
cannot  φ . For the issue raised by these questions is not whether X  really can or 
cannot  φ , or in what ways, if any, X can or cannot  φ : these questions remain 
open even if a sound and comprehensive factual understanding of what agents 
can or cannot do is at hand. Rather, the issue raised by these questions is 
whether the relevant facts  should be accorded a certain status —namely, the 
status of demand-enablers or demand-waivers. This brings in a normative 
issue, and this is so not just because those questions cannot be answered on 
grounds of logic and facts alone. This is so also in other, more substantive 
ways. At least in the case of ethical “oughts,” our conceptions of demand-
enablers and demand-waivers are an important part of what determines how 
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high or low we set our most fundamental standards of conduct, and this 
impacts not only how we construe of these standards, but also what we expect 
of ourselves and others. At the same time, such conceptions enshrine a view of 
what agents ought to bring to the pursuit of doing right and being good—a 
view, that is, that appears to be ethical in own right. 
 To elaborate, consider Cooper’s views. In a related context, he distinguishes 
between “impossibility,” or, roughly, things that we cannot do whatever extra 
effort or support are invested, and “very great diffi culty,” or things that are 
nearly impossible in this sense, and writes:
 If impossibility excuses, one would expect near impossibility to almost excuse, or at 
least to be a mitigating circumstance. For there is only a small gap between impossi-
bility and very great diffi culty. Moreover, if something is very diffi cult, it may be 
impossible always to succeed in doing it and therefore it would be unreasonable 
always to require it. . . . We have to avoid setting our standards either too high or too 
low. If we set them too high, it will be just as objectionable as if we had recom-
mended what was impossible, especially if what is diffi cult seems impossible or is 
impossible, if not for all, at any rate for most. If, on the other hand, we set our standards 
too low, there will be no incentive to try to do what is desirable, though diffi cult. Hence 
we need a distinction between the required and the desirable, between rules and 
ideals. . . . Now if we are to steer between these two extremes of too high standards 
and too low, we require both knowledge and judgment. If we are to know what we 
may rationally prescribe by rules or set up as ideals, we must already know what sort 
of people we are dealing with, what their characters are, what they are capable of, 
what as a matter of fact will be the effect of our recommendations on them. (50) 
 Much of this points in a good direction (even though it underestimates the ex-
tent to which the issue is normative). As Cooper in effect suggests, where 
acting on “oughts” would require capacities, skills, or qualities, that go beyond 
a level of human development that, we take it, people may be expected to bring 
to the pursuit of doing right and being good—that is, the pursuit of integrity, or 
of moral agency—there we often see “oughts” as articulating ideals, rather 
than as requirements (or “rules,” as Cooper puts it in the above passage). And 
where we see “oughts” as articulating ideals, rather than as requirements, we are 
more readily willing to tolerate others’ non-compliance and disagreement—
instead of, say, taking others to be the proper targets of blame, resentment, or 
even retribution. Correspondingly, where “oughts” do not require capacities, 
skills, or qualities that we take to be very diffi cult to achieve or sustain in their 
own rights, there we see less leeway for excuses or lenience. And this evidently 
impacts how hard we try, or believe we must try, and expect others to try. 
 Contrary to what the second half of the quoted passage suggests, however, 
we cannot simply read off our demand-enablers or demand-waivers from our 
factual notions of what real people are like. Some of the reasons for this we 
have come across earlier on already, but there are further, perhaps more 
 358  Dialogue
important reasons. Our conceptions of demand-enablers are normative, even if 
only implicitly so—that is, they are normative at least in virtue of their prac-
tical role and function, whether or not they are recognizable as normative by 
their linguistic surface. Any such conception singles out and privileges some 
subset of human characteristics, and a certain degree of their development, as 
prerequisites of the (at least minimally apt) pursuit of doing right and being 
good. For instance, even where we demand things apparently as basic and 
closely under our control as honesty, empathy, or charity, we presuppose 
that people sustain a suffi cient degree of emotional and intellectual clarity, 
open-mindedness, self-control, courage, fl exibility, and so forth, to realize 
what these virtues call for, what it would take to act on them in a given situa-
tion, and how they rank in relation to other normative considerations. These 
demand-enabling characteristics mark qualities that people can choose to harm 
or to cultivate, but that, we take it, they have reasons to value, and so should 
develop or protect, at least if and to the extent that the demands that are enabled 
by them have any importance. Thus, they mark what we might call  proto-ideals : 
while they do not amount to full-blown substantive ideals of moral agency in 
their own right, they specify basic ingredients, and necessary conditions, of 
what, we take it, it is like to be someone who succeeds in the pursuit of doing 
right and being good—that is, on at least  some conception of what doing right 
and being good actually requires, which may or may not be our own. 11 
 This suggests two additional respects in which demand-waivers are implic-
itly normative. On the one hand, what level of human development we require 
people to bring to the pursuit of doing right and being good partly depends, too, 
on our substantive ethical views, or at least that subset of such views that, we 
take it, refl ect necessary components of any genuine ethical code. After all, 
only if we have a conception of what the business of doing right and being 
good actually asks of people will we be able to know what people need to be 
like in order to participate in that business. On the other hand, conceptions of 
demand-enablers and demand-waivers play an important role in the economy 
of ethical recognition. If indeed they play the role of proto-ideals, then being 
recognised by others as an agent who passes the threshold of having the ability 
of doing right and being good, while it might amount to a mere fraction of the 
kind of ethical recognition people usually desire to enjoy, is a key prerequisite 
for one’s recognition as a fully developed, well-functioning moral agent. Being 
seen as failing to pass that threshold, accordingly, would involve a consider-
able loss of value or standing in the eyes of others: it means to be seen as 
someone who does not even qualify as a participant in the pursuit of integrity, 
far from actually excelling in this pursuit. The importance that this recognition 
has for individuals, in turn, is mirrored in what they expect of others. That is, 
even where we expect others to disagree deeply with our substantive ethical 
views, including, as it were, our more fully developed conceptions of virtue, 
perfection, and goodness of character, we nevertheless expect them to show at 
least some concern for the development and protection of an ability for doing 
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right and being good in themselves or others; and we tend to condemn prac-
tices, beliefs, and social, political, economical, and other contexts that harm or 
destroy this ability in people. 12 
 These stipulative remarks, while plausible, do not aspire to do justice to the 
depth and great variety of considerations that reasonable people can reason-
ably bring to bear on the selection of demand-waivers and demand-enablers. 
However, my aim here is not to provide a comprehensive account of that 
complex issue. Instead, I follow the limited aim of making plausible (i) that 
there are normative and ethical issues at stake in determining what kind of 
“cannot” should play the role of a demand-waiver, and (ii) that placing the 
threshold of demand-waivers hence does not depend on logic and the facts 
alone, but depends, too, on normative considerations that at least sometimes 
are ethical in nature. On this view, it is not only, but also, our norms, values, or 
ideals by which we determine, or have reasons to determine, within what scope 
“oughts” are intelligible—and this, I suggest, is so even (and especially) if the 
relevant facts are at hand. 
 A Very Modest Normativism 
 What kind of view does all this suggest? The factualist policy, we have seen, in 
effect interprets OIC as a maxim such as 
 FP:  As it is not the case that X ought to  φ if X cannot  φ , we should not assume that 
X ought to  φ if there is good reason to believe that X cannot  φ . 
 We have seen, too, that there are reasons to follow this policy whenever there 
are standing reasons to believe that X cannot  φ , and hence it seemed to be the 
case that normativism is both unreasonable and irrelevant. What has now 
emerged, however, suggests a more differentiated picture. Even if there is a 
sense of “can” in which it is true that X cannot  φ , a full justifi cation of waiving 
“oughts” for the reason that X cannot  φ (in the corresponding sense) needs to 
establish why, in the case at hand, the threshold of demand-waivers should be 
placed accordingly. And showing this, I have argued, requires normative con-
siderations, and, at least in the case of some “oughts,” ethical considerations. It 
thus seems that the following doxastic policy would refl ect the true nature of 
applications of OIC—we might think of it as a very modest kind of normativism:
 MN:  If we ought to (or may) place the threshold of demand-waivers accordingly, 
then we should not assume that X ought to  φ if there is good reason to believe 
that X cannot  φ . 
 MN signifi cantly elevates the role normative considerations play in our usage 
of OIC, and, accordingly, in the justifi cation of this usage. In this, it goes be-
yond factualism. But MN does not share the problem of a pure form of norma-
tivism: as it does not simply apply OIC along the lines of the maxim “ ought 
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therefore  can ,” it steers clear of the potential unreasonableness of this maxim. 
MN is normativist in the more modest sense of taking it that the selection of the 
appropriate kind of “can” is a normative issue (that is, within the scope of 
“oughts” that meet the threshold of logical possibility). According to MN, 
then, where we non-trivially use OIC as the rule “cannot therefore not ought”, 
we do not comb out “oughts” simply on the basis of facts and logic, but also 
draw on normative considerations. 
 Now, how deeply ethicised a corresponding, normatively transparent prac-
tice of applying OIC would turn out to be depends on what it takes to cash 
out the antecedent of MN in normative argument. This can vary from case to 
case depending on, for instance, what the relevant normative claims prescribe, 
what ethical and non-ethical costs and benefi ts adopting the proposed set of 
demand-waivers would have, and how much ethical background consensus a 
selection and application of demand-waivers can draw on. But nothing rules 
out that disagreements about the intelligibility of “oughts” will turn into cases 
in which the desirability, acceptability, or normative justifi ability of the sup-
posed demand-waiver thresholds become the crux of the issue, thus turning 
what initially might appear to be a dispute about facts and logic into a substan-
tive ethical dispute about whatever values, norms, or proto-ideals might under-
pin the corresponding demand-waiver threshold. In fact, it seems that we have 
reason to expect agreement about the intelligibility of “oughts”—and so about 
the bounds of normativity—to hinge on agreement about normative, and, more 
narrowly, ethical issues, e.g., about the demandingness and content of our 
proto-ideals. Where no such agreement is available, applications of OIC are 
likely to be as controversial as these normative or ethical issues themselves. If 
that is right, then the discursive purchase and value of OIC will essentially 
depend on the availability of a suitable normative, if not ethical, background 
consensus. 
 Let me conclude my discussion with a conjecture about over-demanding 
“oughts.” Above, I assumed that logically possible “oughts” that prescribe 
what average people are psychologically, intellectually, or physically inca-
pable of doing are not necessarily unintelligible, even though they might be 
unreasonable on other grounds. Obviously, such “oughts” would be pointless, 
if not irrational, as attempts to guide actual choices. 13 Leaving this fact aside, 
however, there also is something ethically troublesome about them. Here is a 
suggestion as to what that troubling element might be. Where such “oughts” 
express (alleged) ethical requirements—as opposed to what Cooper calls 
“ideals”—they seem to confl ict with what appears to be an often-endorsed, 
deeply entrenched substantive ethical idea. We might dub it the idea of “nor-
mative availabilism”:
 NA:  Ethical requirements should be such that average people who conscientiously 
engage in the pursuit of doing right and being good have a fair chance of genu-
inely participating and succeeding in that pursuit. 
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 NA in effect requires our proto-ideals to allow average people the opportunity 
to access the good of qualifying as a full participant in the pursuit of doing 
right and being good. Thus, NA asks us to construe of only those capacities and 
qualities as proto-ideals, or as prerequisites of a participation in the pursuit of 
doing right and being good, that average people have a fair chance of showing. 
In the light of such a view, then, there are reasons to reject ethical requirements 
as unduly demanding that presuppose demand-enablers that would force us to 
distinguish between two moral classes within the class of average people: 
namely, (i) the class of people who in their own right and other things being 
equal “can” do what they are ethically required to do, and who thus do not fail 
to deserve the good of ethical recognition, and (ii) the class of people who in 
their own right and other things being equal “cannot” do what they are ethi-
cally required to do, and who hence fail to deserve the good of ethical recogni-
tion. And such a two-class system would run up against the often-shared 
conviction that average people who conscientiously try hard should have 
equal, or at least relevantly similar, opportunity to access fundamentally 
important goods—such as the good of qualifying as a genuine participant in 
the pursuit of doing right and being good. According to NA, therefore, we 
should not accord to “oughts” the status of ethical requirements—as opposed 
to ideals or supererogative principles—where acting on them would suppose 
special talents, capacities, or skills, so that average people who conscientiously 
try to participate in that pursuit actually have a fair chance to earn recognition 
as such participants. If this makes sense, it might somewhat fl esh out a view 
that has surfaced several times above: namely, the view that our proto-ideals—
which, in turn, impose constraints on what we can construe of as ethical 
requirements—are in their own right subject to ethical constraints. Perhaps it 
is an ethical, potentially egalitarian idea such as normative availabilism that 
stands behind the widely endorsed view that we ought not to ethically require 
what average people who conscientiously try cannot actually do. 
 Notes 
 For helpful feedback, criticism, and discussions on various earlier versions of this paper 
I am indebted to James P. Griffi n, Dale Smith, Micah Schwartzman, Simon Wigley, 
W. Todd Davidson, Andreas Muth, an anonymous referee of  Dialogue , and in 
particular Sabine I. Jentsch and Kinch Hoekstra. 
  1  In recent debate, Streumer ( 2007 ), Vranas, Stern, and Howard-Snyder are amongst 
those who defend that (some kind of) “ought” entails or implies “can.” Hare argues 
that the link between “ought” and “can” is not one of entailment, but is presupposi-
tional. See Hare, p. 54f.; Cooper shares this view. I shall return to a presuppositional 
interpretation later. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that the link between “ought” and 
“can” is extra-logical, and that “ought” conversationally implicates “can.” Brown and 
Kekes, by contrast, see OIC as expressing an ethical view of some special kind. 
  2  For the purposes of my argument, not much depends on how exactly we distinguish 
between the factual and the normative, so long as we agree that there are factual 
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views and that at least some normative views, or “oughts,” seek to guide an agent’s 
choices. However, we might think of views as factual if their best linguistic expres-
sion is descriptive in meaning, and we might think of views as normative if their 
best linguistic expression is prescriptive in meaning. On this usage, views can be 
factual without being empirical, while a view can express an “ought” to which OIC 
applies even if it does not contain the word “ought.” 
  3  For a brand of factualism: see Griffi n ( 1992 ) and ( 1996 ), pp. 96f. and 104ff. For 
Griffi n, purported moral standards that require what is beyond human capacities are 
not simply wrong, but fail to be genuine standards. On this basis, he rejects direct 
and indirect forms of utilitarianism as they require moral agents to engage in types 
of moral thinking which, in Griffi n’s view, are beyond what moral agents are 
capable of. As Robert Stern has argued, this in effect applies a version of OIC to 
utilitarian standards: see Stern, esp. pp. 44ff. As Griffi n seems to suppose that the 
relevant human limitations would have to be determined on factual, non-moral 
grounds, this application of OIC seems to fi t the factualist pattern. Factualism is not 
restricted to moral theory and practice. There are also epistemological instances: 
see Bykvist and Hattiangadi, esp. p. 279. 
  4  On one reading, Kant adopted a form of normativism. As Stern suggests, Kant 
endorsed OIC and reasoned from what we morally ought to do toward a view of 
what we, as moral agents, are capable of doing. This would employ the idea that we 
must be capable of doing what we (allegedly) ought to do as a tool to work out the 
capacities which we must have, or must take ourselves to have, insofar as we take 
ourselves to be moral agents. See Stern ( 2004 ), p. 60. As it is worth observing, this 
form of normativism is of a heuristic, (inter-)subjective variety. As Kant highlights 
in the third part of the  Groundwork , we are bound to think of ourselves as reason-
able beings (or, more generally, as normative beings), and thus must presuppose the 
capacities that this requires. See Kant, pp. 52ff. However, this does not mean that 
we actually have the presupposed capacities as it is possible that we presuppose 
falsehoods or things that cannot be shown to be true or false. For a sophisticated 
recent brand of normativism, see Vranas, esp. pp. 171ff. 
  5  Hare, p. 54. See also Hampshire’s and Hare’s views in Hampshire, Maclagan, and 
Hare, esp. pp. 162ff. and 201ff.; see also Cooper, esp. pp. 46ff. 
  6  The following might help to clarify things. If we represent “ought” as “O” (for the 
deontic “obligatory”), claims to the effect that someone ought to  φ can be repre-
sented as “ ∃ x O( φ x)” (there is a person such that it is obligatory for this person 
to  φ ). In the case of an internal negation, then, “ ∃ x O( φ x)” is transformed into “ ∃ x 
O(¬ φ x)” (there is a person such that it is obligatory for this person not to [ φ ]); 
thus, the negator covers what is claimed to be obligatory (or what is prescribed, 
demanded, required, and so forth). In the case of external negations, however, the 
negator covers also the operator: “ ∃ x O( φ x)” thus yields “ ∃ x ¬[O( φ x)]” (there is a 
person such that it is not the case that [it is obligatory for this person to  φ ]). Accord-
ingly, an external negation waives or suspends an “ought,” or registers that an 
“ought” does not apply, rather than prescribes the opposite. Correspondingly, exter-
nal negations do not carry over prescriptive force: while “It is not the case that X 
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ought to  φ ” is prescriptive if read as stating an internally negated “ought,” it is not 
prescriptive if read as stating an externally negated “ought.” If that is right, then 
OIC, while it allows us to move from “X can’t  φ ” to “It is not the case that X ought 
to  φ ” (given an appropriate conception of “can”—on this matter, see below), does 
not breach Hume’s rule: as the latter is externally negated, no prescriptive “ought” 
is inferred from a descriptive “can.” To reconcile OIC with that rule, therefore, it is 
not necessary to interpret it as a substantive moral principle. This has sometimes 
been overlooked, e.g., by Brown, esp. 207f., and Collingridge, esp. pp. 350f. 
  7  Hare’s view marks a strong performative reading of OIC. Sinnott-Armstrong 
advances a much weaker performative reading when he argues that “ought” con-
versationally implicates “can.” See Sinnott-Armstrong. As Streumer shows, though, 
this reading seems too weak. If “ought” conversationally implicates “can,” then 
speakers can without oddity cancel the implicature by expressing that they do not 
believe that the relevant others can do what they prescribe. But if Paul says 
(i) “You, Betty, ought to  φ ,” but then adds (ii) “I (Paul) believe that you (Betty) 
cannot  φ ,” then this  is odd—at least if Paul utters (i) to prescribe that Betty engage 
in  φ -ing [things might be different if (i) was a different kind of speech-act]. See 
Streumer ( 2003 ), p. 221. 
  8  Kekes, p. 459. Others, too, have noted the issue but then have set aside any deeper 
discussion of implications—even though the issue is crucial for the full appraisal of 
the usage we make of OIC. See, e.g., Howard-Snyder, esp. 234, and Brown, p. 213. 
  9  Montefi ore, esp. p. 33. 
  10  Thus, I partially agree with Cooper, p. 48. Cooper in effect construes of “oughts” 
that prescribe the empirically impossible as intelligible, but sees them as irrational. 
I agree that they can be intelligible, whether or not they necessarily are irrational, 
and hence take it that empirical possibility cannot mark a minimal threshold that all 
“oughts” must meet. I shall come back to this issue below. 
  11  Hampshire appears to overlook this point. He insists that ordinary people usually 
have some more or less vague views of what “normal people” usually are like, and 
he seems to take it to be a purely descriptive, factual matter to invoke such views 
for the purposes of OIC. However, not only is it not a merely factual matter to in-
voke one set of capacities or skills as demand-enablers rather than another; it is also 
the case that our notions of the level and kind of capacities or skills morality 
requires are partly normative in their own right. Cf. his remarks in Hampshire, 
Maclagan, and Hare, pp. 170f. 
  12  This brings in an issue that goes beyond the purposes of my discussion, but that 
should nevertheless at least be touched on now. As an anonymous reviewer has 
pointed out, demand-enabling characteristics might not necessarily be proto-ideals, 
but might instead be substantive ideals of moral agency—that is to say, they might 
sometimes mark conceptions of moral perfection in their own right. I agree that 
ethical codes are  possible that treat the same set of characteristics as demand-
enabling and as marking substantive moral ideals. I conjecture, however, that such 
codes are the exception rather than the rule: we often place the threshold for 
demand-enabling characteristics much lower than the threshold for achieving 
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moral ideals, or moral perfection. The distinction between proto-ideals and ideals 
attempts to refl ect the difference between (i) the set of characteristics that qualifi es 
us as participants in a practice and (ii) the set of characteristics that qualifi es us as 
excelling in that practice. Evidently, we can agree at the level of (i) while disagree-
ing at the level of (ii). E.g., our views of what it requires to be an outstanding chess 
player might differ, while we agree about what it requires to play chess in the fi rst 
place. Applied to the ethical case, if we disagree about the standards of rightness 
and goodness, we will disagree about what it requires in a person to achieve moral 
perfection; but we can nevertheless agree about what it requires in a person 
to qualify as a committed moral agent. Now, our proto-ideals tend to be less 
demanding than do our substantive moral ideals, at least where we leave room for 
such disagreement: after all, even where we deeply disagree with other committed 
moral agents about the standards of rightness and goodness, and hence about what 
it involves and requires to achieve moral perfection, we nevertheless can, and often 
do, recognize these others as committed moral agents. 
  13  Still, we should not dismiss such “oughts” as irrational altogether. Over-demanding 
“oughts” might not primarily amount to attempts to guide choices. And even if we 
focus on “oughts” the speaker intends to guide choices, a logically possible but 
otherwise unfulfi llable prescription can have, as Cooper puts it, a “second life,” 
e.g., by “changing its character and ceasing to be a prescription or by prescribing 
some possible action as a substitute” (Cooper, p. 48.) One such “substitute,” it 
seems to me, can be located at the level of evaluative responses and attitudes. 
Unfulfi llable prescriptions can have the simple upshot of asking us to not con-
tent ourselves with, or even welcome, the conditions that render them unfulfi ll-
able; and even where these conditions are taken to be unchangeable by us or 
others—as they would be in the case of what I refer to above as tragic norms—
the recommendation can be to deplore or resent the way things are anyway. At 
least in the case of tragic norms, this amounts to a substantive, evaluatively 
selective outlook that has, or can have, a considerable impact on how people act 
and look at things. 
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